The events of the last few weeks have demonstrated anew the truth of Lord Halifax’s dictum that although hope “is a very good company by the way…[it] is generally a wrong guide.” Our enemy, savagely striking at will across all of South Vietnam, has finally shattered the mask of official illusion with which we have concealed our true circumstances, even from ourselves. But a short time ago we were serene in our reports and predictions of progress. In April, our commanding general told us that “the South Vietnamese are fighting now better than ever before…” In August, another general told us that “the really big battles of the Vietnam war are over…the enemy has been so badly pummeled he’ll never give us trouble again.” In December, we were told that we were winning “battle after battle,” that “the secure portion of the population has grown…and in contested areas the tide continues to run with us.”
Those dreams are gone. The Vietcong will probably withdraw from the cities…thousands of them will be dead. But they will, nevertheless, have demonstrated that no part or person of South Vietnam is secure from their attacks: neither district capitals nor American bases, neither peasant in his rice paddy nor the commanding general of our own great forces…
Whatever their outcome, the events of the last two weeks have taught us something. For the sake of those young Americans who are fighting today, if for no other reason,the time has come to take a new look at the war in Vietnam; not by cursing the past but by using it to illuminate the future. And the first and necessary step is to face the facts. It is to seek out the austere and painful reality of Vietnam, freed from wishful thinking, false hopes, and sentimental dreams. It is to rid ourselves of the good company of those illusions which have lured us into the deepening swamp of Vietnam…It is time for the truth.
We must, first of all, rid ourselves of the illusions that the events of the past two weeks represent some sort of victory. That is not so…
Again it is claimed that the Communists expected a large-scale popular uprising which did not occur. How ironic it is that we should claim a victory because a people when we have given sixteen thousand lives, billions of dollars, and almost a decade to defend, did not rise up in arms against us. More disillusioning and painful is the fact the population did not rise to defend its freedom against the Vietcong…
This has not happened because our men are not brave or effective, because they are. It is because we have misconceived the nature of the war, it is because we have sought to resolve by military might a conflict whose issue depends upon the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people. It is like sending a lion to halt an epidemic of jungle rot.
This misconception rests on a second illusion—the illusion that we can win a war which the South Vietnamese cannot win for themselves. Two presidents and countless officials have told us for seven years that although we can help the South Vietnamese, it is their war and they must win it…Yet this wise and certain counsel has gradually become an empty slogan, as mounting frustration has led us to transform the war into an American military effort…
Every detached observer has testified to the enormous corruption which pervades every level of South Vietnamese official life…Despite continual promises, the Saigon regime refuses to act against corruption.
…Perhaps we could live with corruption and inefficiency by themselves. However, the consequence is not simply the loss of money or of popular confidence; it is the loss of American lives. For government corruption is the source of the enemy’s strength. It is, more than anything else, the reason why the greatest power on earth cannot defeat a tiny and primitive foe.
You cannot expect people to risk their lives and endure hardship unless they have a stake in their own society. They must have a clear sense of identification with their own government, a belief they are participating in a cause worth fighting for. Political and economic reform are not simply idealistic slogans or noble goals to be postponed until the fighting is over. They are the principal weapons of battle. People will not fight to line the pockets of generals or swell the bank accounts of the wealthy. They are far more likely to close their eyes and shut their doors in the face of their government—even as they did last week…
We have an ally in name only. We support a government without supporters. Without the efforts of American arms, that government would not last a day.
The third illusion is that the unswerving pursuit of military victory, whatever its cost, is in the interest of either ourselves or the people of Vietnam. For the people of Vietnam, the last three years have meant little but horror…Nor does it serve the interest of America to fight this war as if moral standards could be subordinated to immediate necessities…Of course, the enemy is brutal and cruel, and has done the same thing many times. But we are not fighting the Communists in order to become more like them; we fight to preserve our differences…
The truth is that the war in Vietnam does not promise the end of all threats to Asia and ultimately to the United States; rather, if we only proceed on our present course, it promises only years and decades of further draining conflict on the mainland of Asia—conflict which, as our finest military leaders have always warned, could lead us only to natural tragedy.
There is an American interest in South vietnam. We have an interest in maintaining the strength of our commitments—and surely we have demonstrated that…And we have another, more immediate interest: to protect the lives of our gallant young men and to conserve American resources…
The fifth illusion is that this war can be settled in our own way and in our own time on our own terms. Such a settlement is the privilege of the triumphant; of those who crush their enemies in battle or wear away their will to fight.
We have not done this, nor is there any prospect we will achieve such a victory.
Once, in 1962, I participated in such predictions myself. But for twenty years we have been wrong. The history of conflict among nations does not record another such lengthy and consistent chronicle of error. It is time to discard so proven a fallacy…
Unable to defeat our enemy or break his will—at least without a huge, long, and ever more costly effort-we must actively seek a peaceful settlement. We can no longer harden our terms everywhere Hanoi indicates it may be prepared to negotiate; and we must be willing to foresee a settlement which will give the Vietcong a chance to participate in the political life of the country. Not because we want them to, but because that is the only way in which this struggle can be settled. No one knows if negotiations will bring a peaceful settlement, but we do know there will be no peaceful settlement without negotiations. Nor can we have these negotiations just on our own terms…What we must not do is confuse the prestige staked on a particular policy with the interest of the United States; nor should we be unwilling to take risks for peace when we are willing to risk so many lives in war…
These are some of the illusions which must be discarded if the events of law week are to prove, not simply a tragedy, but a lesson—a lesson which carries with it some basic truths…
The central battle in this war cannot be measured by body counts or bomb damage, but by the extent to which the people of South Vietnam act on a sense of common purpose and hope with those that govern them…
The best way to save our most precious stake in Vietnam—the lives of our soldiers—is to stop the enlargement of the war, and…the best way to end casualties is to end the war…
Our nation must be told the truth about this war, in all its terrible reality, both because it is right and because only in this way can any administration rally the public confidence and unity for the shadowed days which lie ahead.
No war has ever demanded more bravery from our people and our government—not just bravery under fire or the bravery to make sacrifices, but the bravery to discard the comfort of illusion, to do away with false hopes and alluring promises. Reality is grim and painful. But it is only a remote echo of the anguish toward which a policy founded on illusion is surely taking us. This is a great nation and a strong people. Any who seek to comfort rather than to speak plainly, reassure rather than instruct, promise satisfaction rather than reveal frustration—they deny that greatness and drain that strength. For today as it was in the beginning, it is the truth that makes us free.