Mr. President, I vote for this resolution because our fighting forces in Vietnam and elsewhere deserve the unstinting support of the American government and the American people. I do so in the understanding that, as Senator [John] Stennis [Mississippi] said yesterday: “It is not a blank check…If [the president] substantially enlarges or changes [his present policy] I would assume he would come back to us…
We confront three possible courses in Vietnam. The first is the course of withdrawal. Such a course would involve a repudiation of commitments undertaken and confirmed by three administrations. It would imply an acquiescence in communist domination of south Asia—a domination unacceptable to the peoples of the area struggling to control and master their own destiny. It would be an explicit and gross betrayal of those in Vietnam who have been encouraged by our support to oppose the spread of Communism. It would promote an inexorable tendency in every capital to rush to [Beijing] and make the best possible bargain for themselves. It would gravely, perhaps irreparably, weaken the democratic position in Asia.
The second is the course of purposely enlarging the war. Let us not deceive ourselves: this would be a deep and terrible decision. We cannot hope to win a victory over Hanoi by such remote and antiseptic means as sending bombers off aircraft carriers…
The course of enlarging the war would mean the commitment to Vietnam of hundreds of thousands of American troops. It would tie our forces down in a terrain far more difficult than that of Korea, with lines of communication and supply for longer and more vulnerable…
Both of these courses—withdrawal and enlargement—are contrary to the interests of the United States and to humanity’s hope for peace. There remains a third course—and this, I take it, is the policy of the administration, the policy we are endorsing today. This is the course of honorable negotiation…
To create the atmosphere for negotiation in these conditions, we must show Hanoi that it cannot win the war, and that we are determined to meet our commitments no matter how difficult. This is the reason and the necessity, as I understand it, for the military action of our government. But I believe we should continue to make clear to Hanoi, to the world, and to our own people that we are interested in discussions for settlement. I believe that our efforts for peace should continue with the same intensity as our efforts in the military field. I believe that we have erred for some time in regarding Vietnam as purely a military problem when in its essential aspects it is also a political and diplomatic problem. I would wish, for example, that the request for appropriations today had made provisions for programs to better the lives of the people of South Vietnam. For success will depend not only on protecting the people from aggression but on giving them the hope of a better life which alone can fortify them for the labor and sacrifice ahead.